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This essay analyses Sino-Italian relations against the background of the increasing 
salience acquired by the west Asia and northern Africa region in Rome’s and 
Beijing’s strategic calculus. As China projects westward through a “New Silk Road” 
culminating at the intersection of the Mediterranean Sea and Europe’s northern 
core, the spectrum of Italy’s foreign policy options opens to innovative forms of 
cooperation with China to meet the challenges emanating from the EU’s southern 
and southeastern neighborhoods. An integrated study of the dynamics of Sino-Italian 
bilateral relations and of the mounting strategic exposure both countries have across 
west Asia and northern Africa underscores the urgency of consolidating the societal 
foundations of the strategic partnership ten years after its launch.  
 
 
In many ways, the current dynamics of Italy-China relations can be read as a function of a much 
wider and more structural trend which, in retrospective, may turn out to be a defining trait of 
Beijing’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping’s leadership: the ambitious westward projection of the 
People’s Republic of China. Such agenda is heir to – or indeed an upgraded synthesis of – two long-
term policies launched by the Chinese leadership at the turn of the century: the “Go out” policy (zou 
chuqu), designed to stimulate Chinese companies to compete globally (a move “accelerated”, 
jiakuai, with the twelfth Five-year plan, 2011-2015), and the “Grand western development” policy 
(xibu dakaifa), crafted to promote growth and enhance stability in China’s western provinces, 
including increasingly restive Tibet and Xinjiang. The need to integrate these policies towards a 
single, comprehensive strategy – catalyzed by the deterioration of a number of the PRC’s bilateral 
relations in East Asia, as well as by the US re-balancing toward the Asia Pacific region under the 
Obama administration – was first introduced in the scholarly debate by Wang Jisi in 2012,2 as the 
“March West” (xijin) theme. One year later, in September 2013, it was officially broadcast as one of 
Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy propositions under the rubric of the “new Silk road for the 21st 
century”.3 
 In advocating this approach China is not isolated: countries from the opposite ends of the Eurasian 
continent – Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan and South Korea above most 4  – have also long 
corroborated a discourse of “connectivity”, which eventually emerged as pivotal during the 10th 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Milan, Italy, in October 2014. Contrasted with the opportunities 
generated through the globalized “commons” – oceanic and air routes, outer and cyber space – the 
untapped economic and social potential which could be leveraged by better integrating the world’s 
largest, richest, and most populated landmass is apparent to all parties concerned. For China, this 
agenda has an especially salient strategic dimension: ambitious proposals such as the promotion of 
a “Eurasian single market” are coherent with Beijing’s broader pursuit of “world multi-polarization, 
[…] a new situation for international relations featuring peaceful coexistence and win-win 
cooperation.”5  
 
Europe is a critically important interlocutor for China in this process of re-configuration of the 
international system. In calling for more “democracy” and “harmony” in international relations6 
Chinese officials echo the classical philosophical concept of he er bu tong to argue for the equal 
legitimacy of an irreducible plurality of political and socio-economic regimes. With its own 
peculiar breeds of capitalism and state-society relations – especially in the Eurozone – and a set of 
strategic interests in its eastern and southern neighborhoods that are not necessarily aligned with US 
foreign policy priorities, in the eyes of Chinese policymakers the European Union stands out as 
potentially the world’s most effective counterpoint to US “hegemonism” (baquanzhuyi).  
 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with most western European countries and the 
European Economic Community in the 1970s, leaders in Beijing have invested significant energy, 
resources and creativity in shaping China’s engagement with Europe. In the early 2000s, as a 
vigorous European commission led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and an 
ambitious European Convention seemed poised to dramatically enhance the process of EU 
integration, then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao led efforts for closer cooperation with Brussels, 
culminating in the launch of the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership in 2003. 
Contextually, Chinese academia registered a steep increase in funding and human resources 
allocated to EU studies, which in most cases absorbed or replaced established research agendas on 
the former Soviet Union and individual European countries.7  
 
After 2005, failure to achieve the two major political goals of the time – the granting of market 
economy status and the lifting of the arms embargo on part of the EU –, coupled with a perception 
of the enduring dominance of US desiderata over EU foreign policy making, led Chinese leaders to 
reassess their expectations in Brussels’s capacity to operate as a fully autonomous “pole” in the 
international system. The re-calibration of Beijing’s approach, perfected in 2013 under Xi Jinping’s 
stewardship, produced what could be termed China’s current Europes policy: no longer an EU-
centric approach, nor a collection of assorted bilateral relations, China’s new engagement with 
Europe more systematically reflects the multilevel nature of governance in the European polity and 
the shifting power distribution among European states. At the Union level, Beijing has reinforced 
its political commitment through Xi Jinping’s visit to EU institutions in March 2014, the first ever 
by a sitting President of the PRC and a strong signal coming just ahead of the European Parliament 
elections of May 2014 and the subsequent selection of the new Presidents of the European Council 
and Commission, as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. Also of continental relevance, given its growing role as China’s key “anchor” in Europe,8 is 
the acceleration in the long-term deepening of the Sino-German comprehensive partnership, 
incorporating a strategic dialogue on diplomatic and security affairs. Bilaterally, China has been 
cultivating the other nine strategic partnerships it forged with EU member states between 2004 and 
2012.9 Finally, in a notable departure from its consolidated practice, in 2013 Beijing launched a 
highly innovative 16+1 “Central and Eastern Europe” (Zhong Dong Ou) dialogue mechanism to 
increase its foreign policy traction with regards to both EU member states and candidate countries 
in the eastern sub-region of Europe stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans. 
 
 
 
West Asia and northern Africa in Italy’s and China’s strategic calculus 
 
Assessed against this background, China’s relations with Italy reveal their peculiar strategic 
potential, which stretches well beyond the figures emerging from the interplay between the world’s 
second- and ninth-largest economies. Especially since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
Italy’s salience – at the EU, sub-regional and bilateral level – has steadily risen in China’s foreign 
policy calculus.10  
 
At the EU level, the contingent reasons for Italy’s particular relevance have shifted remarkably in 
the 2009-2014 period. Regarded as a systemic liability within the Union at the onset of the crisis – 
and one of such magnitude as to potentially cause the unraveling of the Eurozone and thus fresh 
chaos in the global economy – Rome has since re-emerged as a vocal and influential player in the 
debate over the future of the Union. China played a role in this complicated transition: despite 
widespread concerns among Chinese experts and officials about the Italian governments’ capacity 
to steer the country out of its most severe recession since the second World War,11 Chinese 
authorities chose to factor the sustainability of Italy’s sovereign debt in their investment agenda and, 
contrary to other Asian central banks, the People’s Bank of China continued to invest in Italian 
government bonds – albeit at shorter maturities – throughout this period.12  
 
Building on the successful consolidation of public finances under the governments led by Mario 
Monti (November 2011 - April 2013) and Enrico Letta (April 2013 - February 2014), a politically 
more vigorous executive headed by Matteo Renzi has since April 2014 redefined the entrenched 
dynamics of Italy’s act in the EU. Following a historic landslide victory by his Democratic Party at 
the May 2014 European Parliament elections, the Italian Prime Minister has leveraged the higher 
profile of Italian members of the new Parliament – whose caucus now includes two vice-presidents 
and the leader of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the second-largest 
parliamentary group and a key partner in the grand coalition forming the majority – to underpin his 
ambitious agenda for Italy’s presidency of the Council of the European Union (July-December 
2014).  
 
Two outcomes of this more assertive phase in Rome’s EU policy are set to have an enduring impact 
on Sino-Italian relations. The only incumbent administration of a major EU member state to have 
received a strong mandate by the electorate to challenge the current economic policy priorities of 
the Union, the Italian government has been the leading proponent of a shift away from fiscal 
consolidation toward job-creating growth. Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European 
Commission as of November 2014, has proved sensitive to calls for a comprehensive revision of the 
EU economic policies: his political guidelines presented before the European Parliament plenary 
session in July 2014 contain an ambitious “Jobs, Growth and Investment Package” with the aim to 
rekindle growth in the EU, while strengthening the depleting industrial base across the Union.13 A 
neo-Keynesian turn in Brussels is vitally important for the Italian economy to recover without 
resorting to unsustainable debt creation, while healthier growth in the EU is a critical driver for 
China’s own development, as Europe remains the world’s main market for Chinese exports. 
Similarly significant, though more ambivalent as to the impact on relations with China in the 
medium term, is the Commission’s emphasis on manufacture. While strategic for the Italian 
economy – which is the second largest in Europe in terms of industry value added on GDP (20% in 
2013 according to World Bank data), but has lost 25% of its manufacture base during the financial 
crisis – the Commission’s drive to bring the contribution by industry to the Union’s GDP to 20% 
from the current level (16%) is likely to spark increasing competition as China too invests heavily 
in industrial upgrade to compete at higher ends of the value chain.  
 
A second consequential outcome of Italy’s more perceivable footprint in Brussels is the 
appointment of the former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, as High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. With a strong background in 
Transatlantic relations, Ms. Mogherini has signaled her commitment for a fresh approach to the 
EU’s external agenda. Both in her former capacity as Foreign Minister of the country holding the 
rotating Presidency of the EU and with the choice of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank for her first 
trip abroad as confirmed head of Europe’s diplomacy, the new High Representative has hinted at a 
less confrontational course of action vis-à-vis Russia on the Ukraine crisis, and at a more balanced 
distribution of Brussels’ strategic focus across its eastern and southern neighborhoods. This shift 
brings the EU closer not only to Italy’s core foreign policy priorities, but also to the prevailing 
sentiment in Beijing. Alarmed by what they perceived as an inappropriately outspoken support for 
Ukraine’s second “color revolution” by the previous EU leaders, as well as by surreptitious 
Russian-sponsored fragmentation of the Ukrainian state, Chinese officials are (quietly) comfortable 
with Mogherini’s preference for engagement over confrontation with Moscow, as well as with her 
firm rejection of attempts to jeopardize Ukraine’s territorial integrity through the “presidential and 
parliamentary elections” held in the Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics”.14  
 
The new High Representative’s commitment to invest more EU political capital in what China calls 
the west Asia and northern Africa region (Xi Ya Bei Fei)15 is in continuity with her casting a more 
dynamic Mediterranean agenda for Italy’s foreign policy while in government in Rome. Effectively 
breaking with previous practice to make Tunisia his first visit abroad as Prime Minister in February 
2014, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi embraced a further deepening of Italy’s projection in the wider 
Mediterranean space. This is consistent with Italy’s structural interdependence – both economically, 
and security wise – with west Asia and northern Africa, a trait which has become markedly more 
prominent over the past decade, despite increased instability since 2010. With about half of its total 
oil and gas imports coming from Libya, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Italy’s energy 
security is heavily reliant on stable flows across the Mediterranean. Italy is among the top-3 EU 
destinations for exports from seven out of the ten largest economies in this region,16 while the share 
of Italy’s own exports to the same countries has risen by 46% over a decade, from 5.2% of Italy’s 
total exports in 2004 to 7.5% in 2013.17 Investments have grown at an even faster pace: the stock of 
Italian OFDI across the whole of the west Asia and northern Africa region was over 60 billion USD 
in 2012, a 12% share of the global stock of Italian OFDI, up from less than 20 billion USD in 2009 
(3,5%).18 A similar threefold increase has been recorded by the consular registry offices: though 
very reduced in absolute terms, over the 2004-2013 period the number of Italian citizens residing in 
this region has grown from 0.3% to 1% of all Italians officially listed as living abroad (just short of 
five million individuals in total in 2013).  
 
Italian institutions have shifted their posture to keep up with this trend. In 2003, when the number 
of diplomats within the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was at its historical peak, Rome 
deployed 674 diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel across west Asia and northern Africa, or 
12.7% of the total. By 2013, despite a structural trimming of human resources (-23% over a decade), 
personnel in the region had risen to 768 units, reaching 18.7% of total diplomatic and non-
diplomatic personnel in the administration of Italy’s MFA. In 2013 Italy’s embassy in Cairo was 
only marginally less staffed than that in Beijing, and both were among Italy’s top-5 in the world, 
together with Washington D.C., Moscow, and Berlin. The centrality of the west Asia and northern 
Africa region in Italy’s foreign policy projection is also reflected in the allocation of development 
cooperation funds: 9 out of the 20 countries receiving the largest volumes of assistance (actual 
transfers) in 2013 were in this region. Similarly, some 80% of all scholarships awarded through 
Italian ODA funds were concentrated in west Asian and northern African countries, a further 
increase from 73% in 2003.19 
 
Instability across its southern and southeastern neighborhoods is thus a strategic liability for Italy, 
both in terms of rising risk premiums on its current economic engagement with partners in the 
region, and for the severe constraints it poses to the development of further ties in an area that has 
traditionally been more approachable for those small and medium enterprises constituting the 
stressed backbone of Italy’s economy. At the same time, the proximity and immediacy of national 
security concerns have stimulated an urgent re-thinking of the geopolitical landscape Rome is 
facing. Italy’s lost salience as a stable conventional frontier of the free world during the Cold War 
has re-emerged in the insidious shape of Europe’s most exposed and porous border with areas 
incubating potentially devastating non-traditional threats by opaque and radical leaderships. With 
far fewer positional dividends to be gained in this new context at a time of relative retrenchment of 
the US presence in Europe and the Middle East, the Italian government’s priority is to manage the 
rising costs of facing burgeoning influxes of immigrants,20 the radicalization of young Muslims 
domestically, a civil war in contiguous Libya, and the emergence of centripetal dynamics among 
militant Islamists gathering around the banners of the “Islamic State”, which openly quotes Rome 
and the Vatican among its ultimate targets.  
 
With seemingly contingent emergencies being recast as enduring challenges, the spectrum of viable 
foreign policy options has effectively been broadening for Italian authorities. At the EU level, 
attempts to envisage bolder forms of defense integration stand to gain traction, since fiscal 
constraints would not allow countries like Italy to pursue efficient reforms of their armed forces, 
while at the same time increasing their capacity to take responsibility for an enhanced regional role 
through NATO.21 Bilaterally, and particularly with regards to China, the west Asia and northern 
Africa region is home to several prime examples of third countries where the strategic partnership 
between Rome and Beijing could experiment with innovative joint initiatives aimed at fostering 
security, stability and economic development.22 Faced with a widening interests-capabilities gap – 
whereby the magnitude and diversity of economic activities by Chinese operators in west Asia and 
northern Africa far outpaces the political, military and “soft-power” footprint of the PRC in the 
region – the Chinese party-state too requires influential and reliable partners to pursue two of its 
core interests in the region. 
 
The first such interest is the territorial integrity of the PRC, threatened by increased restlessness in 
China’s north-western Xinjiang province. Home to over ten million Uighurs, a sizeable Turkic-
Muslim minority which is in fact a plurality within the province, Xinjiang has traditionally been the 
contested bastion for China’s projection toward central Asia, and, more recently, the center of 
nuclear and missile tests by the Chinese armed forces. With the escalation in China’s energy 
imports, the salience of this province as a strategic junction of international energy corridors has 
risen steeply in recent decades, a trend which is set to be reinforced by the forthcoming 
development of the transport and telecommunication networks planned as part of Xi Jinping’s New 
Silk Road vision. A stable Xinjiang is thus increasingly urgent at the very time when widespread 
frustration with enduring political, economic, social and cultural deprivation has rendered segments 
of the Uighur population more militant and permeable to Islamic fundamentalism. Building on a 
long history of rebellions in pursuit of an independent Turkestan, unrest and terrorist acts have 
plagued especially the more orthodox and economically backward south of the province, before 
spreading to Beijing (October 2013) and even Kunming in China’s deep south (March 2014). 
Beijing faces both an internal challenge – whose dynamics appear increasingly to be beyond the 
capacity of the government to resolve through the current mix of heavy repression and pursuit of 
accelerated economic growth – and two external ones, both of which originate in the west Asia and 
northern Africa region. The first is the pernicious spreading of radical versions of Islam within 
Xinjiang; the second, an even more immediate one, are direct calls to launch a jihad against China 
and its people. In 2009 Algeria-based “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” called for revenge against 
China and declared Chinese workers legitimate targets; shortly thereafter, the “Islamic State of Iraq” 
released a video calling on Muslims to join the Uighur jihadists and fight against China. 
 
A second core interest Beijing must factor in its foreign policy calculus with regards to west Asia 
and northern Africa – including bilateral and multilateral efforts aiming at mitigating the volatility 
of the region – is the preservation of a healthy global economic climate and a workable regional 
environment for China’s own continued development. West Asia and northern Africa form a 
strategic quadrant in this respect: in excess of 43% of China’s energy imports come from this 
region, and Chinese exports towards these markets have grown from 6.4% of the PRC’s total 
exports in 2003 to 9.6% in 2013. Though still relatively modest, Chinese outbound foreign direct 
investment has been flourishing as well, accounting for a stock across the region worth 10.8 billion 
USD in 2012, on par with the rising aggregate value of contracts awarded to PRC companies (37.7 
billion USD in 2012) and the climbing number of relevant Chinese personnel, officially put at about 
150,000 workers but likely to be much higher.23  
This rather sizeable economic interaction between China and countries in west Asia and northern 
Africa is a recent development: of the 29 countries included in this region for the purposes of this 
work, only Sudan could be said to have a meaningful trade relation with China in 2001. In 
2012/2013 the share of trade with the PRC out of total trade with the world is above 7% for at least 
15 countries, with data missing for several others likely to post similar volumes (i.e. Eritrea, Iran, 
Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, UAE). In at least five cases – Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger and Yemen – 
the share is close or above 20%. This trend is set to develop rapidly and consolidate over time: in 
the midst of a vigorous debate on what forms of “creative interventionism” China should pursue – 
seeking to strike a new balance between its global economic interests and its traditionally non-
interventionist foreign policy posture – the argument having the most traction in Beijing posits the 
necessity to induce greater economic dependency on China among countries in west Asia and 
northern Africa as a surrogate of missing military-political influence.24 
 
 
 
Consolidating the Italy-China strategic partnership through cooperation in the Mediterranean 
 
With the European project and the Atlantic alliance at the core of its foreign policy, and the 
Mediterranean region and Russia as traditionally the furthest areas of substantial political projection, 
Italy never developed a full-fledged China policy. After the unraveling of a seemingly effective but 
highly personalized and ultimately fragile “guanxi entente” connecting apical political leaders from 
the two countries through to the early 1990s,25 Italian governments only shifted to a more consistent 
engagement with China in the late 1990s owing to the efforts of President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi 
and Prime Minister Romano Prodi (1996-1998). In 2004, under the second government led by 
Silvio Berlusconi, the two countries officially entered a “strategic partnership”, designed to enhance 
the level of political dialogue, but also – and more urgently, from Rome’s standpoint – to reframe 
diplomatic engagement on the rebalancing of what had evolved into a severely skewed economic 
relationship.  
 
The political economy of Italy-China relations is in fact rendered unique in Europe by three 
fundamental factors and two specific dynamics. The former are constituted by the presence – in 
both the Chinese and Italian economy – of a strong manufacturing sector, heavy reliance on exports, 
and a distinctively low-tech production bias. The two dynamics that have developed upon these 
foundations may be characterized as asymmetrical competition and asynchronous opportunities 
generation.26 Starting in the 1990s, the PRC’s increasingly vigorous projection on global markets 
has been inducing a relentless competitive dynamic, with severe displacement of Italian companies 
across all of Italy’s traditional production sectors, comprehensive restructuring of its small and 
medium enterprises, and a heavy toll on employment borne by the Italian society. Contextually, 
Italian business proved unable to fully exploit the opportunities offered by China’s opening market.  
 
This asynchrony of opportunities for Italian companies was to an extent inevitable, given that a 
sizeable section of national manufacture – specialized in the production and export of consumer 
goods generally identified as “Made in Italy” – was unable to tap into any substantial demand for its 
products in a market that remained rather modest in size and comparatively underdeveloped in 
terms of its consumption patterns.27 Despite official statements of goodwill and the negotiation of a 
first Three-year Action Plan (2010–13) reaffirming the joint effort by the two governments to 
promote increased and more balanced trade, only marginal improvements would be achieved over 
the subsequent decade. Though Italian exports to China have been growing by an average of 8.8% a 
year since 2006, in 2013 their total value did not reach 10 billion EUR, vis-à-vis 23.1 billion worth 
of imports from China, generating a deficit of 13.3 billion EUR (15.4 billion EUR in 2007). 
 
The enduring economic pain associated with the PRC’s rising profile in global trade across the 
world – including markets where Italian operators used to hold a consolidated edge – has had a 
profound impact on China’s image among Italian citizens. For the most part scarcely informed 
about China’s complex reality, with hardly any tradition of meaningful cultural interaction even 
with domestic Chinese immigrants, and rarely exposed to systematic discussions of what features a 
comprehensive, negotiated partnership with China should entail for Italy, the Italian public has 
consistently displayed the most unfavorable opinion of China among European countries. 
According to the Pew Global Attitudes project – whose results are echoed by other relevant surveys 
– in 2014 Italian respondents were third to Japan and Vietnam in the international ranking of 
countries whose citizens declared to have the most negative perception of China. 28  Such 
unenthusiastic outlook is reflected by political leaders: while the Italian government – and 
especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – are regarded as reliable and steady partners by Beijing, 
in parliamentary works China is virtually uniformly discussed as a challenge to Italy’s society and 
national interest.29  
 
The tenuous support the PRC enjoys among Italian citizens is politically consequential. As vast and 
volatile sectors of a deeply frustrated Italian electorate seek culprits for the seemingly inexorable 
decline of living standards throughout the country, China may emerge as an ideal target. The mix of 
economic malaise in Italy, unease among traditional allies for China’s increasingly perceivable 
footprint across Europe and the Mediterranean region, and the absence of established “normative 
entrepreneurs” capable of addressing entrenched skepticism in the Italian society, may impose 
political constraints on Prime Minister Renzi and Premier Li’s commitment to “open a new chapter” 
for “a real upgrade” in bilateral relations.30  
 
Only in 2014 did Beijing appear to finally heed the need for some tangible public action to start 
addressing this slippery perception issue. Besides signing a new Three-year Action Plan (2014–16), 
now calling for “an accelerated, if gradual, rebalancing of trade relations through a substantial 
increase of Italian exports of goods and services to China”, Chinese sovereign wealth funds and 
state-owned enterprises have brought unprecedented dynamism to the previously negligible figures 
of China’s direct investment in Italy. In a series of sudden moves on the Italian stock market, 
investment vehicles drawing on the vast foreign reserves of the People’s Bank of China increased 
their equity holdings in seven strategic Italian companies to bring them just above 2%. While the 
cumulative value of such portfolio is in itself remarkable – over 3 billion EUR as of 24 October 
2014 – it is worth underlining the “signaling effect” of these actions: 2% is the lowest threshold 
requiring the Italian stock exchange monitoring commission to release a public report on “relevant 
shareholdings”. China’s suddenly rising profile in the Italian financial market – and media – was 
subject to much speculation, to the point of being referred to as resembling the “dawn of a second 
Marshall Plan […] severing some relationships formed in postwar Europe”.31 
 
In parallel with this spike in equity acquisition, two of China’s largest state-owned enterprises 
sealed major industrial deals with Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, a public financial institution managing 
Italian postal savings, and progressively morphing into Italy’s own development bank. For a total of 
2.5 bn EUR they acquired 35% of CDP Reti and 40% of Ansaldo Energia, respectively the 
company controlling Italy’s electricity and gas grids, and Italy’s largest manufacturer of power 
generation equipment (Table 1). More agreements were signed in October 2014, during Premier 
Li’s official visit to Rome: 3 billion euros have been earmarked for joint investment in 
infrastructure, equity acquisition, export promotion and support for small and medium enterprises. 
While these memoranda have yet to generate their effects, they follow Prime Minister Renzi’s 
strong call for further investment from China, especially in the form of job-generating greenfield 
investments. 
 
Table 1. Major equity investments in Italy by the Chinese state and state-owned enterprises in 2014 
 
Date Investor Value (EUR mln) Quota Invested company Sector 
21/03/14 PBoC 710.8 2.07% ENEL Energy 
21/03/14 PBoC 1,249.8 2.10% ENI Energy 
11/06/14 Shanghai Electric 400.0 40.00% Ansaldo Energia Technology 
28/07/14 PBoC 58.6 2.02% Prysmian Technology 
29/07/14 PBoC 178.0 2,00% FIAT Manufacture 
29/07/14 PBoC 305.8 2,01% Telecom Italia Telecom 
31/07/14 PBoC 476.7 2,01% Generali Insurance 
31/07/14 State Grid 2,101.0 35.00% CDP Reti (Terna, Snam) Infrastructure 
21/10/14 PBoC 114.1 2,00% Mediobanca Finance 
 
Source: author’s extrapolation from data published by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) 
and the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italiana).  
 
 As both Italy and China rely on west Asia and northern Africa to service around half of their energy 
needs – and share the perception of a direct security challenge emanating from this fractious 
geopolitical quadrant – cooperation to mitigate spillover effects and stabilize the region would 
allow for a stronger bilateral relation to be construed through multilateral regional engagement. 
Save for the inevitable discomfort that a similar course of action would generate among traditional 
allies, most notably the US, available indicators do not point to a lack of common political ground 
for Rome and Beijing to pursue more ambitious agendas. To the contrary: analyzing voting records 
at the General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council32 as a proxy to assess the level of 
political convergence/divergence between the two governments, what emerges is a picture where 
the level of political divergence on issues connected to west Asia and northern Africa is consistently 
lower than the average.  
 
At the General Assembly, a total of 63 resolutions were passed during the 68th session (2013-2014): 
the Italian and Chinese representatives converged on the same voting pattern 54% of times, 
diverged mildly (with one of the two abstaining) in 25% of the votes, and voted outright against the 
other’s position in 21% of cases. Figures are perceivably more positive when only votes relevant to 
the west Asia and northern Africa region (1/3 of the total) are taken into account: here convergence 
rates rise to 74%, mild divergence is reduced to 17% and severe divergence drops to 9% (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Voting patterns at the UN General Assembly: level of convergence, Italy and China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s extrapolation from data published by the UN, http://www.un.org.  
 
At the UN Human Rights Council, where the normative dimension is necessarily prevalent, data 
paint an unsurprisingly more ambivalent picture, but here too an analysis of voting records 
Convergence	  74%	  
Mild	  divergence	  17%	  
Severe	  divergence	  9%	   Convergence	  54%	  
Mild	  divergence	  25%	  
Severe	  divergence	  21%	  
specifically relevant to west Asia and northern Africa points to lower than average divergence. 
Examining voting records of sessions 19 to 27 (February 2012 to September 2014) – including 
special sessions – out of a total of 60 votes taken, Italy and China diverge 83% of times (mild 
divergence 25%, severe divergence 58%). However, figures for the 21 votes taken on west Asia and 
northern Africa show overall divergence dropping to 72%, with cases of the two countries’ 
representatives voting against each other’s agenda (severe divergence) dropping below the 50% 
threshold (48%) (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Voting patterns at the UN General Assembly: level of convergence, Italy and China 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s extrapolation from data published by the UN, http://www.un.org.  
 
 
Lack of established practices and protocols for engagement is the single most immediate factor 
preventing more intense cooperation between Italy and China across west Asia and northern Africa. 
At a more fundamental level, however, both players have yet to effectively cast a foreign policy 
agenda for the “deeper” Mediterranean region they are facing. For the Italian government this 
entails pursuing a re-orientation of the EU’s strategic gaze toward what ought to be understood as a 
regional security complex embracing Mediterranean littoral states – including the Union’s south – 
and those neighboring ones to which the former are connected through intersecting patterns of 
instability propagated by networked militant Islamism.  
 
In the case of China, it implies breaking out of a bureaucratic-cum-conceptual silo mentality 
whereby Europe and the west Asia and northern Africa region are looked at as entirely separate 
entities. Early attempts by Beijing to replicate its diplomatic success in central and eastern Europe 
by proposing similar ad hoc initiatives to a grouping of southern European countries in 2010 are a 
testimony of this approach. They were met with less than lukewarm support by Italian authorities, 
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who would not wish to increase Brussels’ frustration by supporting a further segmentation of the 
European space in terms of China’s political access points. Both Chinese officials and scholars have 
since reiterated this design, while efforts to devise broader formats encompassing southern Europe, 
west Asia and northern Africa (a more comprehensive Nan Ou Xi Ya Bei Fei region) are mired by 
both administrative and cognitive barriers.33 The conversion operated by Chinese academic and 
research institutions which saw an established tradition of country-specific studies substituted by 
broader EU research themes – often monopolized by a focus on EU institutions and major member 
states – has played a significant role in this: as the footprint of the community of Italy watchers in 
China remains very light,34 the specificity of Italy as a pillar of the EU and an anchor for stability in 
the Mediterranean has so far failed to be leveraged.  
 
Table 2. Italy’s and China’s market shares in the ten largest economies of west Asia and northern Africa  
 
 Italy China 
  2004 2013 2004 2013 
Turkey 7.0 5.1 4.6 9.8 
Saudi Arabia 3.4 3.3 6.6 12.8 
Iran 7.1 2.5 4.9 10.3 
Israel 3.8 3.7 3.5 7.9 
Egypt 4.8 5.3 5.1 10.5 
Iraq n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Algeria 8.5 10.3 5.0 12.4 
Qatar 3.4 4.0 3.1 8.0 
Morocco 6.5 4.9 4.2 6.6 
Oman 5.8 1.9 1.7 3.1 
 
Source: author’s extrapolation based on the statistical databases of the International Trade Center Investment Map. 
 
 
Inadequate commitment in finding common ground for joint political efforts in the west Asia and 
northern Africa region, however, is likely to have negative consequences in both the short and 
medium term. In the short term, both Italy and China – two countries sharing an unequivocal 
interest in stability in the Mediterranean – stand to lose out from missing an opportunity to combine 
forces to address what remains an emergency situation across the region. Over the medium term, as 
Table 2 suggests, Italian economic interests are set to face even more intense competition from 
China (as well as from a number of other emerging actors) in the region regardless of the shape it 
takes. Failure to consolidate the societal foundations of the Italy-China strategic partnership at this 
juncture by pursuing positive-sum games both bilaterally and regionally may thus saw the seeds of 
less promising times down the road.	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